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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
Kelley Mala sued Crown Bay Marina after his boat 
exploded. The District Court conducted a bench trial 
during which Mala represented himself and after which 
the court rejected his negligence claims. Mala now 
contends that the court should have provided him with 
additional assistance because of his status as a pro se 
litigant. He also contends that the court wrongfully 
denied his request for a jury trial and improperly ruled on 
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a variety of post-trial motions. We reject these 
contentions and we will affirm. 
I 
Mala is a citizen of the United States Virgin 
Islands. On January 6, 2005, he went for a cruise in his 
powerboat near St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. When his 
boat ran low on gas, he entered Crown Bay Marina to 
refuel. Mala tied the boat to one of Crown Bay‘s eight 
fueling stations and began filling his tank with an 
automatic gas pump. Before walking to the cash register 
to buy oil, Mala asked a Crown Bay attendant to watch 
his boat. 
By the time Mala returned, the boat‘s tank was 
overflowing and fuel was spilling into the boat and into 
the water. The attendant manually shut off the pump and 
acknowledged that the pump had been malfunctioning in 
recent days. Mala began cleaning up the fuel, and at 
some point, the attendant provided soap and water. Mala 
eventually departed the marina, but as he did so, the 
engine caught fire and exploded. Mala was thrown into 
the water and was severely burned. His boat was 
unsalvageable. 
More than a year later, Mala sued Crown Bay in 
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the District Court of the Virgin Islands.
1
 Mala‘s pro se 
complaint asserted two claims: first, that Crown Bay 
negligently trained and supervised its attendant, and 
second, that Crown Bay negligently maintained its gas 
pump. The complaint also alleged that the District Court 
had admiralty and diversity jurisdiction over the case, 
and it requested a jury trial. At the time Mala filed the 
complaint, he was imprisoned in Puerto Rico. Although 
the record is silent on the reason for his imprisonment, it 
is fair to say that he is a seasoned litigant—in fact, he has 
filed at least twenty other pro se lawsuits.
2
 See 
Appellee‘s Br. at 21–22. 
Mala‘s original complaint named ―Crown Bay 
Marina Inc.‖ as the sole defendant. But Mala soon 
amended his complaint by adding other defendants—
including Crown Bay‘s dock attendant, Chubb Group 
Insurance Company, Crown Bay‘s attorney, and ―Marine 
Management Services Inc, [a] registered corporation 
entity duly licensed to conduct business in the State of 
Florida . . . , d/b/a Crown Bay Marina Inc, [ ] a corporate 
                                            
1
 Chief Judge Curtis Gomez was initially assigned 
the case, but Judge Juan Sanchez took over in the middle 
of 2010 and presided over the trial. 
2
 Mala requested a court-appointed attorney in this 
case, but the District Court denied the request because his 
history of filing frivolous lawsuits prevented him from 
securing in forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 
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entity duly licensed to conduct business in St. Thomas 
Virgin Islands of the Unites States.‖ JA 55. The District 
Court allowed Mala to amend his complaint a second 
time by adding his wife as a plaintiff—though the court 
dismissed her loss-of-consortium claim shortly thereafter. 
Mala later attempted to amend his complaint a third time 
by adding Texaco as a defendant. The District Court 
rejected this attempt for failing to comply with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) (requiring the other 
side‘s consent or the court‘s leave).
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As the trial approached, two significant incidents 
took place. First, the District Court decided on its own to 
identify the parties to the case. It concluded that the only 
parties were Mala and ―Marine Services Management 
d/b/a Crown Bay Marina, Inc.‖ JA 132. It thereby 
dismissed all other defendants that Mala had named in 
his various pleadings. 
Next, Crown Bay filed a motion to strike Mala‘s 
jury demand. Crown Bay argued that plaintiffs generally 
do not have a jury-trial right in admiralty cases—only 
when the court also has diversity jurisdiction. And Crown 
Bay asserted that the parties were not diverse in this case, 
which the court itself had acknowledged in a previous 
                                            
3
 Because the District Court refused to add Texaco 
as a defendant, see JA 94 n.2, we have omitted ―Texaco 
Puerto Rico‖ from the case caption. 
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order. In response to this motion, the District Court ruled 
that both Mala and Crown Bay were citizens of the 
Virgin Islands. The court therefore struck Mala‘s jury 
demand, but nevertheless opted to empanel an advisory 
jury. 
The trial began at the end of 2010—nearly four 
and a half years after Mala filed his complaint. The delay 
is partly attributable to the District Court‘s decision to 
postpone the trial until after Mala‘s release from prison. 
At the close of Mala‘s case-in-chief, Crown Bay renewed 
a previous motion for summary judgment. The court 
granted the motion on the negligent-supervision claim 
but allowed the negligent-maintenance claim to go 
forward. At the end of the trial, the advisory jury returned 
a verdict of $460,000 for Mala—$400,000 for pain and 
suffering and $60,000 in compensatory damages. It 
concluded that Mala was 25 percent at fault and that 
Crown Bay was 75 percent at fault. The District Court 
ultimately rejected the verdict and entered judgment for 
Crown Bay on both claims. 
After his loss at trial, Mala filed a flurry of 
motions, asking the court to vacate its judgment and hold 
a new trial. These motions contained numerous 
overlapping objections. A magistrate judge prepared 
three Reports and Recommendations that summarized 
Mala‘s claims and urged the District Court to reject all of 
them. Judge Sanchez adopted these recommendations 
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and explained his reasoning in an eight-page opinion.  
This appeal followed. Mala argues that the District 
Court made three reversible errors. First, the court failed 
to accommodate Mala as a pro se litigant. Second, it 
improperly denied his request for a jury trial. Third, it 
erroneously adopted the magistrate‘s recommendations. 
We consider and reject these arguments in turn.
4
 
II 
Mala first argues that the District Court did not 
give appropriate consideration to his status as a pro se 
litigant. Specifically, he claims that the District Court 
should have provided him with a pro se manual—a 
manual that is available to pro se litigants in other 
districts in the Third Circuit and throughout the country. 
We conclude that pro se litigants do not have a right to 
general legal advice from judges, so the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide a 
manual. 
                                            
4
 The District Court had admiralty jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Mala argues that the court 
also had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
This argument determines the outcome of Mala‘s jury 
claim, so we will discuss it in Part III. At all events, we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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According to Mala, ―[t]here is comparatively little 
case law regarding the responsibility of courts to provide 
information and assistance to the pro se party.‖ 
Appellant‘s Br. at 7. A more accurate statement is that 
there is no case law requiring courts to provide general 
legal advice to pro se parties. In a long line of cases, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that courts are 
under no such obligation. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
465 U.S. 168, 183–184 (1984) (―A defendant does not 
have a constitutional right to receive personal instruction 
from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does 
the Constitution require judges to take over chores for a 
pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by 
trained counsel as a matter of course.‖); McNeil v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). 
The Supreme Court revisited this line of cases 
nearly a decade ago. In Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 
(2004), the Court rejected the idea that district courts 
must provide a specific warning to pro se litigants in 
certain habeas cases. It concluded that ―[d]istrict judges 
have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se 
litigants.‖ Id. at 231. After all, a ―trial judge is under no 
duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom 
procedure or to perform any legal ‗chores‘ for the 
defendant that counsel would normally carry out.‖ Id. 
(quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth 
Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)) (quotation 
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marks omitted). Because of this general rule, courts need 
not, for example, inform pro se litigants of an impending 
statute of limitation. See Outler v. United States, 485 
F.3d 1273, 1282 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007) (―[N]o case has 
ever held that a pro se litigant should be given actual 
notice of a statute of limitations.‖). 
The general rule, then, is that courts need not 
provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants. Aside 
from the two exceptions discussed below, federal courts 
treat pro se litigants the same as any other litigant. This 
rule makes sense. Judges must be impartial, and they put 
their impartiality at risk—or at least might appear to 
become partial to one side—when they provide trial 
assistance to a party. See Pliler, 542 U.S. at 231 
(―Requiring district courts to advise a pro se litigant . . . 
would undermine district judges‘ role as impartial 
decisionmakers.‖); Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 
1364 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Julie M. Bradlow, 
Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se 
Civil Litigants, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 671 (1988) 
(―[E]xtending too much procedural leniency to a pro se 
litigant risks undermining the impartial role of the judge 
in the adversary system.‖). Moreover, this rule eliminates 
the risk that judges will provide bad advice. See Pliler, 
542 U.S. at 231–32 (noting that warnings and other legal 
advice ―run the risk of being misleading themselves‖); 
see also Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial 
Advocacy in Pro Se Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 
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Ind. L. Rev. 19, 42 (2009) (―[G]iving legal advice is 
prohibited by multiple canons of judicial conduct.‖). 
To be sure, some cases have given greater leeway 
to pro se litigants. These cases fit into two narrow 
exceptions. First, we tend to be flexible when applying 
procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially when 
interpreting their pleadings. See, e.g., Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 
655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (―The obligation to 
liberally construe a pro se litigant‘s pleadings is well-
established.‖). This means that we are willing to apply 
the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has 
failed to name it. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 
(3d Cir. 2003). And at least on one occasion, we have 
refused to apply the doctrine of appellate waiver when 
dealing with a pro se litigant. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 
147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993). This tradition of leniency 
descends from the Supreme Court‘s decades-old decision 
in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). In Haines, the 
Court instructed judges to hold pro se complaints ―to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.‖ Id. at 520; see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 
94 (2007). 
We are especially likely to be flexible when 
dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants. Such litigants 
often lack the resources and freedom necessary to 
comply with the technical rules of modern litigation. See 
Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1983) 
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(―Pro se prison inmates, with limited access to legal 
materials, occupy a position significantly different from 
that occupied by litigants represented by counsel‖). The 
Supreme Court has ―insisted that the pleadings prepared 
by prisoners who do not have access to counsel be 
liberally construed and [has] held that some procedural 
rules must give way because of the unique circumstance 
of incarceration.‖ McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 
113 (1993) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that pro se prisoners successfully 
file a notice of appeal in habeas cases when they deliver 
the filings to prison authorities—not when the court 
receives the filings, as is generally true. Houston v. Lack, 
487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988) (―Such prisoners cannot 
take the steps other litigants can take to monitor the 
processing of their notices of appeal and to ensure that 
the court clerk receives and stamps their notices of appeal 
before the 30-day deadline.‖). 
Yet there are limits to our procedural flexibility. 
For example, pro se litigants still must allege sufficient 
facts in their complaints to support a claim. See Riddle v. 
Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). And 
they still must serve process on the correct defendants. 
See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1234–35 (9th 
Cir. 1984). At the end of the day, they cannot flout 
procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that 
apply to all other litigants. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 
(―[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in 
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ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to 
excuse mistakes by those who proceed without 
counsel.‖); Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 
2007).  
The second exception to our general rule of 
evenhandedness is likewise narrow. We have held that 
district courts must provide notice to pro se prisoners 
when converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment. See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 
F.3d 315, 340 (3d Cir. 2010). In particular, courts must 
tell pro se prisoners about the effects of not filing any 
opposing affidavits. Id.; see also Somerville v. Hall, 2 
F.3d 1563, 1564 (11th Cir. 1993); Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 
453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 
F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the rule 
applies only to pro se prisoners). But see Williams v. 
Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903–04 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that such notice is unnecessary); Martin v. Harrison 
Cnty. Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).  
Similarly, the Supreme Court has required district 
courts to provide notice to pro se litigants in habeas cases 
before converting any motion into a motion to vacate 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Castro v. United States, 540 
U.S. 375, 383 (2003). The underlying principle is simple: 
when a court acts on its own in a way that significantly 
alters a pro se litigant‘s rights—for example, by 
converting one type of motion into a different type of 
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motion—the court should inform the pro se party of the 
legal consequences. But as the Supreme Court made clear 
only a few months after Castro, notice is the exception. 
Nonassistance is the rule. See Pliler, 542 U.S. at 231, 
233–34. 
That brings us back to Mala‘s claim. Mala argues 
that the District Court should have provided him with a 
pro se manual. Various district courts have created 
manuals to help pro se litigants navigate the currents of 
modern litigation. See, e.g., U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Clerk’s Office 
Procedural Handbook (2012), 
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/ 
handbook/handbook.pdf; U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, Pro Se Package: A 
Simple Guide to Filing a Civil Action (2009), 
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/PROS
E_manual_2009.pdf; U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, Procedural Guide for Pro Se Litigants 
(2006), http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/rules/proselit-
guide.pdf. These manuals are generally available online 
and in the clerk‘s office. They explain how to file a 
complaint, serve process, conduct discovery, and so 
forth. In addition, public-interest organizations have 
supplemented these manuals by publishing their own 
guides for pro se litigants. See, e.g., Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review, A Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual (9th 
ed. 2011), http://www3.law.columbia.edu/ hrlr/jlm/toc/. 
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These manuals can be a valuable resource for pro 
se litigants. They may help litigants assert and defend 
their rights when no lawyer is available. And they can 
reduce the administrative burden on court officials who 
must grapple with inscrutable pro se filings. Because 
these manuals do not provide case-specific advice and 
because they are available to all litigants—not just to pro 
se litigants—they do not impair judicial impartiality. See 
Nina I. VanWormer, Note, Help at Your Fingertips: A 
Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se 
Phenomenon, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 983, 1018 (2007) (―By 
providing pro se litigants with easy, understandable, and 
reliable access to both procedural and substantive law, 
court systems can uphold their mandate to impartially 
administer justice to all, while at the same time 
increasing the efficiency with which they can manage 
their dockets.‖). Without a doubt, these manuals are 
informative, and inexperienced litigants would do well to 
seek them out. 
That said, nothing requires district courts to 
provide such manuals to pro se litigants. See Pliler, 542 
U.S. at 231 (―District judges have no obligation to act as 
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.‖). To put it 
another way, pro se litigants do not have a right—
constitutional, statutory, or otherwise—to receive how-to 
legal manuals from judges. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 
183–184 (―[T]he Constitution [does not] require judges 
to take over chores for a pro se defendant that would 
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normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of 
course.‖). And Mala has less reason to complain than the 
neophyte pro se litigant, having filed more than twenty 
suits in the past. See Appellee‘s Br. at 21–23. His 
experiences have made him well acquainted with the 
courts. See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 
1994) (refusing to be flexible when interpreting a 
complaint because the plaintiff was ―an extremely 
litigious inmate who [was] quite familiar with the legal 
system and with pleading requirements‖); Cusamano v. 
Sobek, 604 F. Supp. 2d 416, 445–46 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
The District Court‘s failure to provide Mala with a pro se 
litigation manual was not an abuse of discretion.
5
  
Mala also suggests that the District Court abused 
its discretion by not considering his status as a prisoner 
during the early stages of litigation. His problem, 
                                            
5
 We would reject Mala‘s claim even if the District 
Court had an obligation to provide a pro se manual. For 
one thing, Mala never indentified anything that he would 
have done differently if he had access to such a manual. 
Moreover, it is unclear why he needed a pro se manual 
from the District Court of the Virgin Islands. He could 
have received a manual from other district courts or from 
public-interest organizations. These manuals are easy to 
access through an internet search, which Mala could have 
performed while doing his legal research at the local 
library. Any error therefore would be harmless. 
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however, is that he has not identified anything in 
particular that the court should have done differently. In 
fact, the court was solicitous of Mala‘s needs as an 
incarcerated litigant—delaying the trial until his release 
from prison and allowing him to amend the complaint at 
least once despite his noncompliance with Rule 15(a). 
Contrary to Mala‘s suggestion, the court accommodated 
his status as a prisoner. 
III 
Mala next argues that the District Court 
improperly refused to conduct a jury trial. This claim 
ultimately depends on whether the District Court had 
diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that it had 
only admiralty jurisdiction, and Mala urges us to 
conclude otherwise. We generally exercise plenary 
review over jurisdictional questions, but factual findings 
that ―underline a court‘s determination of diversity 
jurisdiction . . . are subject to the clearly erroneous rule.‖ 
Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the 
District Court found that both Mala and Crown Bay were 
citizens of the Virgin Islands. These findings were not 
clearly erroneous, and so we conclude that Mala did not 
have a jury-trial right. 
The Seventh Amendment creates a right to civil 
jury trials in federal court: ―In Suits at common law . . . 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.‖ U.S. Const. 
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amend. VII. Admiralty suits are not ―Suits at common 
law,‖ which means that when a district court has only 
admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), the 
plaintiff does not have a jury-trial right. Complaint of 
Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 132 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 
458–60 (1847)). But the saving-to-suitors clause in 
§ 1333(1) preserves state common-law remedies. U.S. 
Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 390 (3d Cir. 
2002). This clause allows plaintiffs to pursue state claims 
in admiralty cases as long as the district court also has 
diversity jurisdiction. Id. In such cases, § 1333(1) 
preserves whatever jury-trial right exists with respect to 
the underlying state claims. Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 
519, 526 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the saving-to-suitors 
clause saves ―common law remedies, including the right 
to a jury trial‖); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 
537–38 (1970).  
Mala argues that the District Court had both 
admiralty and diversity jurisdiction. As a preliminary 
matter, the court certainly had admiralty jurisdiction. The 
alleged tort occurred on navigable water and bore a 
substantial connection to maritime activity. See Jerome 
B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 
U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (explaining the two-part test for 
admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333(1)).  
The grounds for diversity jurisdiction are less 
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certain. District courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 only if the parties are completely diverse. 
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 836 (3d 
Cir. 2011). This means that no plaintiff may have the 
same state or territorial citizenship as any defendant. Id. 
The parties agree that Mala was a citizen of the Virgin 
Islands. He was imprisoned in Puerto Rico when he filed 
the suit, but his imprisonment is of no moment. Prisoners 
presumptively retain their prior citizenship when the 
gates close behind them. See Hall v. Curran, 599 F.3d 
70, 72 (1st Cir. 2010); Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 
1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006); Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 
F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1991). No one challenges that 
presumption here. 
Unfortunately for Mala, the District Court 
concluded that Crown Bay also was a citizen of the 
Virgin Islands. Mala rejects this conclusion, stating that 
the sole defendant was Marina Management Services—a 
Florida corporation that operated Crown Bay Marina as 
one of its divisions. For its part, Crown Bay 
acknowledges that Marina Management Services 
managed the day-to-day operations at Crown Bay 
Marina, but Crown Bay argues that the two were separate 
legal entities. We recognize that the District Court could 
have done more to clarify the relationship between these 
19 
 
two entities.
6
 Even so, Mala‘s claim must fail. 
Mala bears the burden of proving that the District 
Court had diversity jurisdiction. McCann v. Newman 
Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) 
                                            
6
 A few months before trial, the District Court 
decided to ―clarify the pre-trial status of [the] case.‖ JA 
131. Because no one else had been served, the court 
dismissed all defendants other than ―Marine Services 
Management d/b/a Crown Bay Marina, Inc.‖ JA 132. The 
acronym ―d/b/a‖ stands for ―doing business as‖ and 
typically indicates that the second name (here, ―Crown 
Bay Marina, Inc.‖) is the party‘s trade name, whereas the 
first name (here, ―Marine Services Management,‖ which 
seems to be a reference to Marina Management Services) 
is the party‘s legal name. See, e.g., Tai-Si Kim v. 
Kearney, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (D. Nev. 2012). 
This suggests that a Florida corporation was the sole 
defendant.  
On the other hand, during the pre-trial 
proceedings, Crown Bay claimed to be a Virgin Islands 
entity, separate from Marina Management Services, see 
JA 122, and later provided testimony to support that 
claim, see Trial 12/6 at 75–76. Also, the District Court 
concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction. See JA 96. 
n.3. This suggests that the sole defendant was a Virgin 
Islands business and that Marina Management Services 
was a separate entity. 
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(―The party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the 
burden of . . . proving diversity of citizenship by a 
preponderance of the evidence.‖). Mala failed to meet 
that burden because he did not offer evidence that Crown 
Bay was anything other than a citizen of the Virgin 
Islands. Mala contends that Crown Bay admitted to being 
a citizen of Florida, but Crown Bay actually denied 
Mala‘s allegation that Crown Bay Marina was a division 
of ―Marine Management Services.‖ Compare JA 55 ¶ 9 
(alleging that Crown Bay Marina was a ―corporate 
entity‖ under ―Marine Management Services‖), with JA 
61 ¶ 9 (admitting that ―Marine Management Services‖ is 
a Florida corporation but denying everything else).
7
  
Absent evidence that the parties were diverse, we 
are left with Mala‘s allegations. Allegations are 
insufficient at trial. McCann, 458 F.3d at 286 (requiring a 
showing of diversity by a preponderance of the 
                                            
7
 Mala also points out that during a pretrial 
hearing, Crown Bay‘s attorney introduced himself as 
―Mark Wilczynski on behalf of Marina Management 
Services, Inc.‖ JA 144. But this statement does not 
appear to be an admission that Crown Bay was the same 
entity as Marina Management Services. Indeed, Crown 
Bay‘s attorney might have introduced himself this way 
simply because the District Court had previously 
identified the defendant as ―Marine Services 
Management d/b/a Crown Bay Marina, Inc.‖ 
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evidence). And they are especially insufficient on appeal, 
where we review the District Court‘s underlying factual 
findings for clear error. Smith, 511 F.3d at 399. Under 
this standard, we will not reverse unless ―we are left with 
the definite and firm conviction‖ that Crown Bay was in 
fact a citizen of Florida. Id. (quotation mark omitted). 
Mala has not presented any credible evidence that Crown 
Bay was a citizen of Florida—much less evidence that 
would leave us with the requisite ―firm conviction.‖  
Mala tries to cover up this evidentiary weakness by 
again pointing to his pro se status. He argues that we 
should construe his complaint liberally to find diversity. 
But Mala‘s problem is not a pleading problem. It is an 
evidentiary problem. Our traditional flexibility toward 
pro se pleadings does not require us to indulge 
evidentiary deficiencies. See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 
102, 108 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000) (indicating that pro se 
litigants still must present at least affidavits to avoid 
summary judgment). Accordingly, the parties were not 
diverse and Mala does not have a jury-trial right.
8
 
                                            
8
 At various times, Mala suggested that the District 
Court also had supplemental jurisdiction. It is unclear 
whether he was referring to supplemental jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or whether he was calling 
diversity jurisdiction by the wrong name. Either way, the 
argument fails. As noted above, the parties were not 
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Mala also claims that the District Court erred by 
rejecting the advisory jury‘s verdict. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 39(c) states that ―[i]n an action not 
triable of right by a jury, the court, on motion or on its 
own . . . may try any issue with an advisory jury.‖ 
District courts are free to use advisory juries, even absent 
the parties‘ consent. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c)(2) 
(requiring consent for a nonadvisory jury when the party 
does not have a jury-trial right), with id. 39(c)(1) (not 
requiring consent for an advisory jury); see also 
Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 415 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 
(2d Cir. 2005). District courts are also free to reject their 
verdicts, as long as doing so is not independently 
erroneous. Wilson v. Prasse, 463 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 
1972) (―[F]indings by an advisory jury are not binding.‖). 
As a result, the District Court did not err in this case by 
empanelling an advisory jury or by rejecting its verdict. 
                                                                                                  
diverse. And even if he was referring to supplemental 
jurisdiction under § 1367, such jurisdiction exists only 
when there is no independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (stating that 
supplemental jurisdiction is limited to ―other claims‖ 
over which district courts do not have ―original 
jurisdiction‖). Here, the District Court had admiralty 
jurisdiction over all parts of Mala‘s claim, as both parties 
acknowledge. The court did not need supplemental 
jurisdiction. 
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IV 
Mala‘s final claim is that the District Court 
erroneously ruled on a handful of post-trial motions. 
After losing at trial, Mala asked the court to vacate the 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
and to grant a new trial under Rules 50(b) and 59. These 
motions contained several overlapping arguments.
9
 A 
magistrate judge recommended that the District Court 
reject these motions, and the court adopted the 
magistrate‘s recommendations. We conclude that the 
court did not make a mistake in doing so. 
In reviewing a district court‘s decision to adopt a 
magistrate‘s recommendations, ―[w]e exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‘s legal conclusions and 
apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.‖ 
O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam). Mala claims that ―the Court stubbornly 
maintained that its rulings were correct and proper; no 
real review took place of the facts of the case, especially 
on the issue of jurisdiction allowing the Plaintiff a jury 
trial, nor acknowledging that the Court‘s decision to 
                                            
9
 Among other things, Mala claimed that he should 
have received a jury trial, that the District Court 
improperly ignored evidence, that the court did not have 
jurisdiction once Mala had filed a recusal motion, and 
that Crown Bay had committed fraud on the court. 
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empanel an advisory jury during the pretrial conference 
was unclear and confusing to the Plaintiff at best.‖ 
Appellant‘s Br. at 23. 
Mala‘s claim has little substance. The magistrate 
prepared three Reports and Recommendations that 
discussed Mala‘s arguments and urged the District Court 
to deny his motions. Judge Sanchez explained his reasons 
for doing so in an eight-page opinion. Both judges were 
meticulous and thorough. Mala has given us no reason to 
accept his general argument that ―no real review took 
place.‖  
Beyond this general argument, Mala alleges two 
specific shortcomings. First, he bemoans the District 
Court‘s refusal to conduct a jury trial. As noted above, 
this was not an error. Although the court could have been 
clearer about Crown Bay‘s citizenship, Mala nevertheless 
failed to meet his burden of proving diversity. Second, 
Mala asserts that he failed to understand that the jury‘s 
findings would be nonbinding. This was not the District 
Court‘s fault. The court plainly stated that the jury would 
be advisory. See JA 147 (―[CROWN BAY‘S 
ATTORNEY]: And is that in fact the Court‘s position 
that there will be an advisory jury? THE COURT: Yes.‖). 
We therefore reject Mala‘s final claim. 
* * * 
Mala is a serial pro se litigant. In this case, he 
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convinced a jury of his peers to award him over $400,000 
in damages. Unfortunately for Mala, the jury was 
advisory, and the District Court rejected the verdict. We 
conclude that the court did not err by using an advisory 
jury or by rejecting its verdict. Nor did the court err by 
adopting the magistrate‘s recommendations or by failing 
to provide a pro se manual. For these reasons we will 
affirm the District Court‘s judgment. 
 
